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1 Introduction
Sometimes it is needed in approximate reasoning to deal simultaneously with
both fuzziness of propositions and modalities, for instance one may try to
assign a degree of truth to propositions like “John is possibly tall” or “John
is necessarily tall”, where “John is tall” is presented as a fuzzy proposition.
Fuzzy logic should be a suitable tool to model not only vagueness but also
other kinds of information features like certainty, belief or similarity, which
have a natural interpretation in terms of modalities.
We address in this paper the case of pure modal operators for Go¨del logic,
one of the main systems of fuzzy logic arising from Ha´jek [11] classification.
For this purpose we consider a many-valued version of Kripke semantics for
modal logic where both, propositions at each world and the accessibility
relation, are infinitely valued in the standard Go¨del algebra [0,1].
We provide strongly complete axiomatizations for the -fragment and
the ✸-fragment of the resulting minimal logic. These fragments are shown
to behave quite asymmetrically. Validity in the first one is univocally deter-
mined by the class of frames having a crisp (that is, two-valued) accessibility
relation, while validity in the second requires truly fuzzy frames. In addi-
tion, the -fragment does not enjoy the finite model property with respect
to the number of worlds or the number of truth values while the ✸-fragment
does.
1The results of this paper were announced at the meeting on ”Logic, Computability
and Randomness”, Cordoba, Argentina, Sept. 2004. Publication was delayed, aiming
to axiomatize the full logic with both modal operators, which resulted elusive. Since
the results have been quoted in some publications based in an incomplete preliminary
manuscript, we have chosen to circulate this revision. We obtained recently the strong
completeness of the full logic, result which will appear elsewhere.
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We consider also the Go¨del analogues of the classical modal systems T, S4
and S5 for each modal operator and show that the first two are characterized
by the many-valued versions of the frame properties which characterize their
classical counterparts.
Our approach is related to Fitting [7] who considers Kripke models taking
values in a fixed finite Heyting algebra; however, his systems and complete-
ness proofs depend essentially on finiteness of the algebra and he fact that
his languages contain constants for all the truth values of the algebra. We
most relay on completely different methods.
Modal logics with an intuitionistic basis and Kripke style semantics have
been investigated in a number of relevant papers (see Ono [12], Fischer
Servi [5], Bos˘zic and Dos˘en [3], Font [8], Wolter [13], from an extensive
literature), but in all cases the models carry two (or more) crisp accessibility
relations satisfying some commuting properties: a pre-order to account for
the intuitionistic connectives and one or more binary relations to account for
the modal operators. Our semantics has,.instead, a single arbitrary fuzzy
accessibility relation and does not seem reducible to those multi-relational
semantics since the latter enjoy the finite model property for  (cf.Grefe
[10]).
We assume the reader is acquainted with modal and Go¨del logics and
the basic laws of linear Heyting algebras (cf. Chagrov [2]).
2 Go¨del-Kripke models
The language L✸ of propositional Go¨del modal logic is built from a set
V ar of propositional variables, logical connectives symbols ∧,→,⊥, and the
modal operator symbols  and ✸. Other connectives are defined:
⊤ := ϕ→ ϕ
¬ϕ := ϕ→ ⊥
ϕ ∨ ψ := ((ϕ→ ψ)→ ψ)) ∧ ((ψ → ϕ)→ ϕ))
ϕ←→ ψ := (ϕ→ ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ).
L and L✸ will denote, respectively, the -fragment and the ✸-fragment of
the language.
As stated before, the semantics of Go¨del modal logic will be based in
fuzzy Kripke models where the valuations at each world and also the acces-
sibility relation between worlds are [0, 1]-valued. The symbols · and ⇒ will
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denote the Go¨del norm in [0, 1] and its residuum, respectively:
a · b = min{a, b}, a⇒ b =
{
1, if a ≤ b
b, otherwise
the derived maximum and pseudo-complement operations will be denoted
g and −, respectively. This yields the standard Go¨del algebra; that is, the
unique Heyting algebra structure in the linearly ordered interval.
Definition 2.1 A Go¨del-Kripke model (GK-model) will be a structure
〈W,S, e〉 where:
• W is a non-empty set of objects that we call worlds of M.
• S :W ×W → [0, 1] is an arbitrary function (x, y) 7−→ Sxy.
• e :W × V ar → [0, 1] is an arbitrary function (x, p) 7−→ e(x, p).
The evaluations e(x,−) : V ar → [0, 1] are extended simultaneously to
all formula in L✸ by defining inductively at each world x:
e(x, ϕ ∧ ψ) := e(x, ϕ) · e(x, ψ)
e(x, ϕ→ ψ) := e(x, ϕ)⇒ e(x, ψ)
e(x,⊥) := 0
e(x,✷ϕ) := infy∈W {Sxy ⇒ e(y, ϕ)}
e(x,✸ϕ) := supy∈W{Sxy · e(y, ϕ)}.
It follows that e(x, ϕ ∨ ψ) = e(x, ϕ)g e(x, ψ) and e(x,¬ϕ) = −e(x, ϕ).
The notions of a formula ϕ being true at a world x, valid in a model
M = 〈W,S, e〉, or universally valid, are the usual ones:
ϕ is true in M at x, written M |=x ϕ, iff e(x, ϕ) = 1.
ϕ is valid in M , written M |= ϕ, iff M |=x ϕ at any world x of M.
ϕ is GK-valid, written |=GK ϕ, if it is valid in all the GK-models.
Clearly, all valid schemes of Go¨del logic are GK-valid. In addition,
Proposition 2.1 . The following modal schemes are GK-valid:
K (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
Z ¬¬θ→ ¬¬θ
D✸ ✸(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (✸ϕ ∨✸ψ) (in fact, an equivalence)
Z✸ ✸¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬✸ϕ
F✸ ¬✸⊥
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Proof: Let M = 〈W,S, e〉 be an arbitrary Go¨del-Kripke model and x ∈W.
(K) By definition 2.1 and properties of the residuum we have for any
y ∈ W : e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) · e(x,ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ (e(y, ϕ) ⇒ e(y, ψ)) · (Sxy ⇒
e(y, ϕ)) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y, ψ)). Taking the meet over y in the last expression:
e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) · e(x,ϕ) ≤ e(x,ψ), hence e(x,(ϕ → ψ)) ≤ e(x,ϕ →
ψ).
(Z) Utilizing the Heyting algebra identity: − − (x ⇒ y) = (x ⇒ −− y),
we have: e(x,¬¬✷θ) = − − e(x,✷θ) ≤ − − (Sxy ⇒ e(y, θ)) = (Sxy ⇒
−−e(y, θ)) = (Sxy ⇒ e(y,¬¬θ)). Taking meet over y in the last expression:
e(x,¬¬✷θ) ≤ e(x,✷¬¬θ).
(D✸) By properties of suprema and distributivity of g over ·, e(✸(ϕ ∨ ψ))
= supy{Sxy · (e(y, ϕ)g e(y, ϕ))} = supy{Sxy · e(y, ϕ)}g supy{Sxy · e(y, ϕ)}
(Z✸) Sxy · e(¬¬ϕ, y) ≤ −− (Sxy · e(ϕ, y)) ≤ −− e(✸ϕ, x) = e(¬¬✸ϕ, x).
(F✸) e(x,✸⊥) = supy{Sxy · 0} = 0. 
The Modus Ponens rule preserves truth at every world of any GK-model.
On the other hand, the classical introduction rules for the modal operators
RN :
ϕ
ϕ
RN✸ :
ϕ→ ψ
✸ϕ→ ✸ψ
.
do not preserve local truth. However,
Proposition 2.2 RN and RN✸ preserve validity at any given model, thus
they preserve GK-validity.
Proof: . (RN) If e(x, ϕ) = 1 for all x then e(x,ϕ) = infy{Sxy ⇒
e(y, ϕ)} = inf{1} = 1 for all x. (RN✸) If e(x, ϕ → ψ) = 1 for all x then
Sxy · e(y, ϕ) ≤ Sxy · e(y, ψ) ≤ e(x,✸ψ). Taking join over y in the left hand
side of the last inequality, e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ψ). 
Semantic consequence is defined for any theory T ⊆ L✸, as follows:
Definition 2.2 T |=GK ϕ if and only if for any GK-model M and any
world x in M, M |=x T implies M |=x ϕ.
An alternative notion of logical consequence arises naturally. Set
e(x, T ) = {e(x, ϕ) : ϕ ∈ T} then:
Definition 2.3 T |=GK≤ ϕ if and only if for any GK-model M and any
world x in M, inf e(x, T ) ≤ e(x, ϕ).
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Clearly, |=GK≤ implies |=GK , and it will follow from our completeness
theorems that both notions are equivalent for countable theories. This fact
has been already observed for pure Go¨del logic by Baaz and Zach in [1].
Note that Modus Ponens preserves consequence but this is not the case
of the inference rules RN and RN✸.
3 On strong completeness of Go¨del logic
To prove strong completeness of the unimodal fragments L and L✸ we will
reduce the problem to pure Go¨del propositional logic.
In the rest of this paper L(X) will denote the Go¨del language built from
a set of propositional variables X and the connectives ∧,→,⊥.
Let G be a fixed axiomatic calculus for Go¨del logic, say the following one
given by Ha´jek ([11], Def. 4.2.3.):
(ϕ→ ψ)→ ((ψ → χ)→ (ϕ→ χ))
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ ϕ
(ϕ ∧ ψ)→ (ψ ∧ ϕ)
(ϕ→ (ψ → χ))←→ ((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ χ)
((ϕ ∧ ψ)→ χ)←→ (ϕ→ (ψ → χ))
ϕ→ (ϕ ∧ ϕ)
((ϕ→ ψ)→ χ)→ (((ψ → ϕ)→ χ)→ χ)
⊥ → ϕ
MP: From ϕ and ϕ→ ψ, infer ψ
⊢ will denote deduction in this calculus.
It is well known that G is deductively equivalent to Dummett logic, the
intermediate logic obtained by adding to Heyting calculus the pre-linearity
schema:
(ϕ→ ψ) ∨ (ψ → ϕ).
Given a valuation v : X → [0, 1], let v denote the extension of v to L(X)
according to the Go¨del interpretation of the connectives. We will need the
following strong form of standard completeness for Go¨del logic:
Proposition 3.1 Let T be a countable theory and U a countable set of
formulas of L(X) such that for every finite S ⊆ U we have T 0
∨
S then
there is a valuation v : X → [0, 1] such that v(α) = 1 for all α ∈ T and
v(β) < 1 for each β ∈ U.
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Proof: Extend T to a prime theory T ′ (that is, T ′ ⊢ α ∨ β implies T ′ ⊢
α or T ′ ⊢ β ) satisfying the same hypothesis with respect to U (this is
standard). The Lindenbaum algebra L(X)/≡T ′ of T
′ is linearly ordered since
by primality and the pre-linearity schema T ′ ⊢ α → β or T ′ ⊢ β → α.
Moreover, the valuation v : X → L(X)/T ′ , v(x) = x/≡T ′ is such that
v(T ) = 1, v(β) < 1 for all β ∈ U. As T ′ is countable we may assume X is
countable and thus, being also countable, L(X)/≡T ′ is embeddable in the
Go¨del algebra [0, 1], therefore, we may assume v : X → [0, 1]. 
From the proposition we obtain the usual formulation of completeness
for countable T . We can not expect strong standard completeness of G for
uncountable theories, as the following example illustrates.
Example. Set T = {(pβ → pα) → q : α < β < ω1} where ω1 is the first
uncountable cardinal, then T 0 q. Otherwise we would have Σ ⊢ q, for some
finite Σ = {(pαi+1 → pαi) → q : 1 ≤ i < n}, but this is not possible by
soundness of G, because the valuation v(q) = 12 , v(pαi) =
1
2(1 −
1
i+1) for
1 ≤ i ≤ n, makes v(pαi) < v(pαi+1) <
1
2 and thus v((pαi+1 → pαi)→ q) = 1
for 1 ≤ i < n, while v(q) < 1. On the other hand, there is no valuation v
such that v(T ) = 1 and v(q) < 1, because that would imply v(pβ → pα) < 1
for all α < β < ω1, and thus the set {v(pα) : α < ω1} would be ordered in
type ω1, which is impossible because any well ordered subset of ([0, 1], <) is
at most countable.
4 Completeness of the -fragment
Let G be the formal system on the language L which is obtained by adding
to the system G for Go¨del logic (applied to L) the following axiom schemes
and rule:
K: (ϕ→ ψ)→ (ϕ→ ψ)
Z: ¬¬θ → ¬¬θ
NR: From ϕ infer ϕ
⊢G ϕ expresses theorem-hood in this logic. Proofs with assumptions are
also allowed, with the restriction thatNR is to be applied to theorems only
(or, what amounts to the same, to previous steps of the proof not depending
on the assumptions). T ⊢G ϕ will express that there is such a proof of ϕ
with assumptions from the set T.
The deduction theorem follows readily by induction in the length of
proofs:
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DT: T ∪ {α} ⊢G ϕ implies T ⊢G α→ ϕ.
Applying consecutively DT, NR, K, and MP, we obtain the derived
rule:
Lemma 4.1 If µ1, ..., µk ⊢G ϕ then ✷µ1, ...,✷µk ⊢G ✷ϕ.
We obtain also soundness of G:
Lemma 4.2 T ⊢G ϕ implies T |=GK≤ ϕ, hence, T |=GK ϕ.
Proof: By the deduction theorem, T ⊢G ϕ implies ⊢G (∧Σ→ ϕ) for some
finite Σ ⊆ T. Since the axioms of G are valid in all GK-models (Prop. 2.1)
and MP, NR, K preserve validity (Prop. 2.2) then |=GK (∧Σ → ϕ).
Therefore, inf e(x, T ) ≤ e(x,∧Σ) ≤ e(x, ϕ) for any world x in any GK-model.

Let
TG = {A : A is a theorem of G}
Since all uses of NR in a proof of T ⊢G ϕ produce theorems of G, the
proof may bee seen as one in which Modus Ponens is the only rule utilized
and TG is part of the assumptions. That is,
Lemma 4.3 . T ⊢G ϕ if and only if T ∪ TG ⊢ ϕ in pure Go¨del logic.
To prove strong completeness of G we will define a canonical GK-model
with the property that for any countable theory T and any formula ϕ such
that T 0G ϕ, there is a world x in the model which assigns the value 1 to
T but less than 1 to ϕ. A surprising fact will be that this may be achieved
with a model where the accessibility relation is crisp.
Let L = {θ : θ ∈ L} be the set of formulas in L which start with
the connective . Then any formula in L may be seen as a formula of
the pure Go¨del language built from X = V ar ∪ L by means of ∧,¬,⊥.
That is, we may consider the formulas in L as additional propositional
variables for Go¨del logic.
Canonical model M = (W
∗, S∗, e∗).
• The set of worldsW ∗ will consist of those valuations v : V ar∪L → [0, 1]
which satisfy v(TG) = 1 when extended to v : L = L(V ar∪L)→ [0, 1]
according to the Go¨del interpretation of ∧,→,⊥.
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• The fuzzy accessibility relation between worlds in M (actually a crisp
relations) will be given by
S∗vw =
{
1, if v(✷θ) ≤ w(θ), for all θ ∈ L
0, otherwise
,
• The valuation associated to the world v will be v ↾ V ar. That is, e∗(p, v) =
v(p) for any p ∈ V ar.
For the sake of simplicity, we will write v(ϕ) for v(ϕ), from now on.
Lemma 4.4 For any world v in the canonical model M and any ϕ
e∗(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ).
Proof: This is proven by induction in the complexity of ϕ seen again as a
formula of L. The atomic step and the inductive steps for the Go¨del con-
nectives being straightforward, it is enough to verify inductively e∗(v,✷ϕ) =
v(✷ϕ). By induction hypothesis we may assume e∗(w,ϕ) = w(ϕ) for any
w,and thus we must show
v(✷ϕ) = inf
w
{w(ϕ) : S∗vw = 1}
By definition, S∗vw = 1 implies v(✷ϕ) ≤ w(ϕ), hence
v(✷ϕ) ≤ inf
w
{w(ϕ) : S∗vw = 1}.
Since equality above is trivial for v(ϕ) = 1, it remains only to show in case
v(ϕ) = α < 1 that
inf
w
{w(ϕ) : S∗vw = 1} ≤ α. (1)
That is, for any ǫ > 0 there is w such that S∗vw = 1 and w(ϕ) < α+ ǫ. To
see this we prove first:
Claim. Let v be a world of M and ϕ be such that v(✷ϕ) = α < 1, then
there exists a world u of M such that u(ϕ) < 1 and
(i) u(θ) = 1 if v(✷θ) > α
(ii) u(θ) > 0 if v(✷θ) > 0.
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Proof: Assume v(✷ϕ) = α < 1 and set
Tϕ,v = {θ : v(✷θ) > α} ∪ {¬¬θ : v(✷θ) > 0}
Notice that v(✷µ) > α for any µ ∈ Tϕ,v because v(✷θ) > 0 implies
v(¬¬✷θ) = 1, and thus v(✷¬¬θ) = 1 since v satisfies axiom Z. This
implies that Tϕ,v 0G ϕ. Otherwise, µ1, ..., µk ⊢G ϕ for some µi ∈ Tϕ,v and
thus
✷µ1, ...,✷µk ⊢G ✷ϕ
by Lemma 4.1. Hence, by Lemma 4.2 and the previous observations,
α < min{✷µ1, ...,✷µk} ≤ v(✷ϕ),
a contradiction. By Lemma 4.3 we have Tϕ,v ∪TG 0 ϕ and by countability
of Tϕ,v ∪ TG we may use the completeness theorem of Go¨del logic (Propo-
sition 3.1) to get a Go¨del valuation u : L→ [0, 1] such that u(Tϕ,v) = 1 and
u(ϕ) < 1. Then u ∈ M and (i) holds by construction. Moreover, (ii) is
satisfied because u(¬¬θ) = 1 and thus u(θ) > 0 if v(✷θ) > 0. This ends the
proof of the claim.
Pick now an strictly increasing function g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that
g(1) = 1, g(0) = 0, and g[(0, 1)] = (α,α+ ǫ).
As g is an homomorphism of Heyting algebras, the valuation w = g ◦ u
preserves the value 1 of the formulas in TG and thus it belongs to M.
Moreover, v(✷θ) ≤ w(θ) for all θ:
- if v(✷θ) > α because w(θ) = g(u(θ)) = g(1) = 1 by (1) above.
- if 0 < v(✷θ) ≤ α because then 0 < u(θ) ≤ 1 by (2) above, and thus
w(θ) = g(u(θ)) ∈ (α,α+ ǫ) ∪ {1}.
This means S∗vw = 1, and since u(ϕ) < 1 we have, w(ϕ) = g(u(ϕ)) < α+ ǫ,
which shows 1. 
Call a GK-model crisp if S : W ×W → {0, 1}, and write T |=Crisp ϕ if
the consequence relation holds at each node of any crisp GK-model.
Theorem 4.1 For any countable theory T and formula ϕ in L the follow-
ing are equivalent:
(i) T ⊢G ϕ
(ii) T |=GK≤ ϕ
(iii) T |=GK
(iv) T |=Crisp ϕ.
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Proof: By Lemma 4.2, it is enough to show (iv) ⇒ (i). If T 0G ϕ then
T ∪ TG 0 ϕ by Lemma 4.3, and by strong completeness of Go¨del logic
there is a valuation v : V ar ∪ L → [0, 1] such that v(T ) = v(TG) = 1
and v(ϕ) < 1. Hence, v ∈ W ∗ by definition, e∗(v, T ) = v(T ) = 1, and
e∗(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ) < 1 by Lemma 4.4, showing that M |=v T but M 2v ϕ.
That is, T 2Crisp ϕ because the canonical model is crisp. 
The example in Section 3 shows that standard strong completeness does
not hold in modal Go¨del logic with respect to uncountable theories.
5 G does not have the finite model property
The following example shows that G does not have the finite model property
with respect to GK-models. The scheme
¬¬θ → ¬¬θ,
reciprocal of axiom Z, is not valid because it fails in the (crisp) model M
= (N, S, e), where
Smn = 1 for all m,n
e(n, p) = 1
n+1 for all n
Indeed, e(n,¬¬p) = −− 1
n+1 = 1 for all n and thus, e(0,✷¬¬p) = inf{1⇒
1} = 1. On the other hand, e(0,✷p) = infn∈N{1 ⇒
1
n+1} = 0, and thus
e(0,¬¬✷p) = 0.
However,
Theorem 5.1 ✷¬¬θ → ¬¬✷θ is valid in any GK-model 〈W,S, e〉 with fi-
nite W .
Proof: Given a model M = 〈W,S, e〉, we have:
e(v,✷¬¬θ) =
{
0, ∃w ∈W : Svw > 0 and e(w, θ) = 0
1, otherwise
(2)
Now, e(v,¬¬✷θ) = 0 iff and only if e(v,✷θ) = 0, which means there is a
sequence of worlds {wn}n such that {Svwn ⇒ e(wn, θ)}n converges to 0,
that is,
e(¬¬✷θ, v) =


0, if
∃{wn} ⊆W : Svwn > e(wn, θ) for all
n ∈ N, and {e(wn, θ)}n converges to 0
1, otherwise
(3)
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Assume e(v,✷¬¬θ) = 1. Then, according to (2), Svw = 0 or e(w, θ) > 0
for any w ∈W. If we had e(v,¬¬✷θ) = 0, then the sequence {wn}n∈N given
by (3) would satisfy: Svwn > e(wn, θ), and hence e(wn, θ) > 0 for all n
by the previous observation. If W is finite, the set {e(wn, θ) : n ∈ N} has
a minimum positive value and thus the sequence, {e(wn, θ)}n would not
converge to 0, a contradiction. 
The proof of the theorem shows that ✷¬¬θ → ¬¬✷θ would be valid in
all GK models with finite Go¨del algebra of values.
6 Completeness of the ✸-fragment
The system G✸ results by adding to G the following axiom schemes and rule
in the language L✸ :
D✸: ✸(ϕ ∨ ψ)→ (✸ϕ ∨✸ψ)
Z✸: ✸¬¬ϕ→ ¬¬✸ϕ
F✸: ¬✸⊥
RN✸: From ϕ→ ψ infer ✸ϕ→ ✸ψ
As in the case of the -fragment, in proofs with assumptions the rule
RN✸ is to be used in theorems only, and under this definition we have the
deduction theorem DT, the derived rule:
Lemma 6.1 If ϕ ⊢G✸ ψ then ✸ϕ ⊢G✸ ✸ψ.
and the soundness theorem:
Lemma 6.2 T ⊢G✸ ϕ implies T |=GK≤ ϕ, hence, T |=GK ϕ.
Let TG✸ be the set of theorem of G✸, then it follows, as in the case of
G, that
Lemma 6.3 T ⊢G✸ ϕ if and only if T ∪ TG✸ ⊢ ϕ in Go¨del logic.
Let ✸L✸ = {✸θ : θ ∈ L✸}. The canonical model M✸ = (W
∗, S∗, e∗) is
defined as follows:
• W ∗is the set of valuations v : V ar ∪✸L✸ → [0, 1] such that v(TG✸) = 1
and its positive values have a positive lower bound:
inf
ϕ∈L✸
{v(θ) : v(θ) > 0} = δ > 0 (4)
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when the formulas in ✸L✸ are seen as propositional variables and v is ex-
tended to L✸ = L(V ar ∪✸L✸) as a Go¨del valuation.
• The fuzzy relation between worlds in M✸ is given by
S∗vw := inf
ϕ∈L✸
{w(θ)⇒ v(✸θ)}.
• e∗(v, p) := v(p) for any p ∈ V ar.
Lemma 6.4 For any world v in the canonical model M✸ and any ϕ ∈ L✸
we have e∗(v, ϕ) = v(ϕ).
Proof: The only non trivial step in a proof by induction on complex-
ity of formulas of L✸ is that of ✸. By induction hypothesis, e
∗(v,✸ϕ)
= supw{S
∗vw · e∗(w,ϕ)} = supw{S
∗vw · w(ϕ)}, then we must show
supw{S
∗vw · w(ϕ)} = v(✸ϕ). By definition
S∗vw ≤ w(ϕ)⇒ v(✸ϕ),
for any ϕ ∈ L✸ and w ∈W
∗, then S∗vw ·w(ϕ) ≤ v(✸ϕ), which yields taking
join over w:
e∗(v,✸ϕ) ≤ v(✸ϕ).
The other inequality is trivial if v(✸ϕ) = 0. For the case v(✸ϕ) > 0, let w be
given as in the following claim then v(✸ϕ) = α = S∗vw · w(ϕ) ≤ e∗(v,✸ϕ),
ending the proof of the lemma.
Claim. If v is a world of M✸ such that v(✸ϕ) = α > 0, there exists a
world w of M✸ such that w(ϕ) = 1 and S
∗vw = α.
Proof: Set
Γϕ,v = {θ ∈ L✸ : v(✸θ) < α} ∪ {¬¬µ : µ ∈ L✸, v(✸µ) = 0}.
This set is not empty because v(✸0) = 0 by axiom F✸. Moreover, for any
finite subset of Γϕ,v, say {θ1, ..., θn} ∪ {¬¬µ1, ...,¬¬µm}, we have
ϕ 0
G✸
θ1 ∨ ... ∨ θn ∨ ¬¬µ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬¬µm.
Otherwise, we would have
✸ϕ ⊢G✸ ✸(θ1 ∨ ... ∨ θn ∨ ¬¬µ1 ∨ ...¬¬ ∨ µm) RN✸
✸θ1 ∨ ... ∨✸θn ∨✸¬¬µ1 ∨ ... ∨✸¬¬µm D✸
✸θ1 ∨ ... ∨✸θn ∨ ¬¬✸µ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬¬✸µm Z✸,
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which would imply by Lemma 6.2
v(✸ϕ) ≤ max({v(✸θi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} ∪ {v(¬¬✸µi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ m}) < α,
a contradiction. Therefore, we have by Lemma 6.1
TG✸, ϕ 0 θ1 ∨ ... ∨ θn ∨ ¬¬µ1 ∨ ... ∨ ¬¬µm;
By Proposition 3.1 there is a Heyting algebra valuation u : L → [0, 1] such
that u(ϕ) = u(TG✸) = 1 and u(θ) < 1 for all θ ∈ Γϕ,v. Thus, u satisfies the
further conditions:
(i) u(ϕ) = 1
(ii) u(θ) < 1 if v(✸θ) < α, because then θ ∈ Γϕ,v
(iii) u(θ) = 0 if v(✸θ) = 0, because then ¬¬θ ∈ Γϕ,v and so u(¬¬θ) < 1
which implies u(θ) = 0.
Let g : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] be the strictly increasing function:
g(x) =


1 if x = 1
δ(x+ 1)/2 if 0 < x < 1
0 if x = 0
where δ is given by (4). Clearly the valuation w = g◦u inherits the properties
(i), (ii) (iii) of u, with (ii) in the stronger form:
(ii′) w(θ) < δ if v(✸θ) < α
Moreover, w(θ) > 0 implies w(θ) > δ/2, by construction, and w(TG✸) = 1
because g is an homomorphism of Heyting algebras, hence, w belongs to
M✸.
To see that S∗vw = α, note that w(θ) ≤ v(✸θ) whenever v(✸θ) < α.
If 0 < v(✸θ) because then w(θ) < δ ≤ v(✸θ) by (ii′) and definition of δ.
If v(✸θ) = 0 because then w(θ) = 0 by (iii). Since (w(θ) ⇒ v(✸θ)) ≥ α
for v(✸θ) ≥ α, and (w(ϕ) ⇒ v(✸ϕ)) = (1 ⇒ α) = α, we have S∗vw =
infϕ∈L✸{w(ϕ)⇒ v(✸ϕ)} = α. 
Theorem 6.1 For any countable theory T and formula ϕ in L✸, T |=GK ϕ
iff T ⊢G✸ ϕ.
Proof: Assume that T 0G✸ ϕ, then T ∪TG✸ 0 ϕ. By strong completeness of
Go¨del logic, there is a Heyting algebra valuation v such that v(T ∪TG✸) = 1
and v(ϕ) < 1. Since v might not be a world in M✸ compose it with the
Heyting algebra homomorphism: g(x) = (x+1)/2 for x > 0, g(0) = 0. Then
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v′ = g ◦ v belongs to M✸ and we still have v
′(T ) = 1, v′(ϕ) < 1. Applying
Lemma 6.4 to v′ we have e∗(v′, T ) = 1, e∗(v′, ϕ) < 1. That is, M✸ |=v′ T
and M✸ 2v′ ϕ. Hence, T 2G✸ ϕ. 
By Lemma 4.2 we have again, as in the case of L, that |=GK and
|=GK≤ coincide in L✸. However, |=GK no longer coincides with |=Crisp as
the following example illustrates.
Example. G✸ is not complete for crisp models. The formula ¬¬✸ϕ→
✸¬¬ϕ holds in all crisp models because e(x,¬¬✸ϕ) > 0 implies that there
is y such that Sxy · e(y, ϕ) > 0. Thus, Sxy = 1 and −− e(y, ϕ) = 1 showing
that e(y,✸¬¬ϕ) ≥ Sxy ·(−−e(y, ϕ)) = 1. But this formula is not a theorem
of G✸ because it fails in the two worlds model:
x
1
2→ y, e(x, p) = e(y, p) = 1.
where e(x,¬¬✸p) = 1, and e(y,✸¬¬ϕ) = 12 .
7 G✸ has the finite model property
For any sentence ϕ such that 0
G✸
ϕ we may construct a finite counter-model
inside M✸.
Theorem 7.1 If 0G✸ ϕ then there is a model M with finitely many worlds
such that M 2GK ϕ.
Proof: It follows from the Claim in Lemma 6.4 that for all θ and v ∈ M✸
there is w ∈ M✸ such that v(✸θ) = S
∗vw ·w(θ). (if v(✸θ) = 0 any w works).
Given θ, let fθ(v) be a function choosing one such w for each v. For any
formula θ let r(θ) be the nesting degree of ✸ in θ, that is, the length of a
longest chain of occurrences of ✸ in the tree of θ.
Given ϕ such that 0⊢G✸ ϕ, let v0 be a world (valuation) inM✸ such that
v0(ϕ) < 1. For each j ≤ n = r(ϕ), let Sj be the set of subformulas of ϕ of
rank ≤ j, and define inductively the following sets of valuations:
M0 = {v0}
Mi+1 =Mi∪ {fθ(v) : v ∈Mi, ✸θ ∈ Sn−i}
Clearly, Mn is finite. Consider the model induced in Mn by restricting e
∗
and S∗ of M✸ to Mn × V ar and Mn ×Mn respectively. We call this model
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Mn for simplicity. Then for any formula ✸θ ∈ Sj and v ∈ Mn−j there is
w ∈Mn−(j−1) such that v(✸θ) = S
∗vw · w(ϕ), and thus
v(✸θ) = sup
w
{S∗vw · w(θ) : w is a world in Mn}.
This permits to show by induction in j ≤ n that for all θ ∈ Sj, v ∈Mn−j we
have v(θ) = eMn(v, θ). In particular, eMn(v0, ϕ) = v0(ϕ) < 1, which shows
Mn 2 ϕ. 
The proof of the previous theorem still works if we define the accessibility
relation in Mn using only subformulas of ϕ,
S∗nvw := min
θ∈Sn
{w(θ)⇒ v(✸θ)}
This means that we have to use only a finite number of values of [0, 1] in
the proof, and thus e∗ takes values in a finite subalgebra of [0, 1].
8 Modal extensions
The modal systems we have considered so far correspond to minimal modal
logic, the logic of Go¨del-Kripke models with an arbitrary accessibility fuzzy
relation. We may consider also for each modal operator the analogues of the
classical modal systems T, S4 and S5, usually presented as combinations of
the following axioms:
T: ✷ϕ→ ϕ T✸: ϕ→ ✸ϕ
4: ✷ϕ→ ✷✷ϕ 4✸: ✸✸ϕ→ ✸ϕ
B: ϕ→ ✷¬✷¬ϕ B✸: ϕ→ ¬✸¬✸ϕ
Call a GK-model M = 〈W,S, e〉 reflexive if Sxx = 1 for all x ∈ W ,
(min)transitive if Sxy·Syz ≤ Sxz for all x, y, z, and symmetric if Sxy = Syx
for all x, y ∈W.
Proposition 8.1 T and T✸ are valid in all reflexive GK-models, 4 and
4✸ are valid in all transitive GK-models, B and B✸ are valid in all GK-
symmetric models.
Proof: If Sxx = 1 for all x then (T): e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ (Sxx ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) =
e(x, ϕ), and (T✸): e(x,✸ϕ) ≥ Sxx · e(x, ϕ) = e(x, ϕ).
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Assume Sxy · Syz ≤ Sxz for all x, y, z.(4): e(x,✷ϕ) · Sxy · Syz ≤
(Sxz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)) · Sxz ≤ e(z, ϕ). Hence, e(x,✷ϕ) · Sxy ≤ (Syz ⇒ e(z, ϕ)).
Taking meet over z in the right hand side: e(x,✷ϕ) ·Sxy ≤ e(y,✷ϕ); hence,
e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(y,✷ϕ)) for all y and thus e(x,✷ϕ) ≤ e(x,✷✷ϕ).
(4✸): For any x, y, z, Sxy · Syz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ Sxz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ). Hence,
Syz · e(z, ϕ) ≤ (Sxy ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)). Taking join over z in the left, e(x,✸ϕ) ≤
(Sxy ⇒ e(x,✸ϕ)), thus Sxy ·e(x,✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ)). Taking join again in the
left, e(x,✸✸ϕ) ≤ e(x,✸ϕ).
Assume Sxy = Syx for all x, y. (B): We prove the stronger ¬ϕ →
✷¬✷ϕ. Assume e(x,¬ϕ) > 0 then e(x, ϕ) = 0. Take any y such that Sxy >
0, then e(y,✷ϕ) ≤ (Syx ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = (Sxy ⇒ e(x, ϕ)) = 0. Therefore,
e(y,¬✷ϕ) = 1, and (Sxy ⇒ e(y,¬✷ϕ)) = 1. This shows that x(✷¬✷ϕ) =
1. (B✸): Suppose e(x, ϕ) > e(x,¬✸¬✸ϕ) then e(x,¬✸¬✸ϕ) = 0 and
e(x,✸¬✸ϕ) = 1. This means that there is y such that Sxy · e(x,¬✸ϕ) >
0 thus Sxy > 0 and e(x,¬✸ϕ) = 1, hence e(y,✸ϕ) = 0, therefore,
Syx · e(x, ϕ) = 0 which is absurd because Syx = Sxy > 0 and e(x, ϕ) > 0
by construction. 
Let Ref , Trans, and Symm denote the GK-classes of models satisfy-
ing, respectively,reflexivity, transitivity, and symmetry, and let |=C denote
semantic consequence with respect to models in the class C.
Theorem 8.1 (i) G+T and G✸+T✸ are strongly complete (for countable
theories) with respect to |=Refl.
(ii) G+4 and G✸+4✸ are strongly complete with respect to |=Trans.
(iii) GS4 := G+T+4 and GS4✸ := G✸+T✸+4✸ are strongly complete
with respect to |=Refl∩Trans .
Proof: Soundness follows from Proposition 8.1. Completeness follows, in
each case, by asking the worlds of the canonical models introduced in the
completeness proofs of G and G✸ to satisfy the corresponding schemes.
The key fact is that these schemes force the accessibility relations S∗

vw =
infϕ∈L{v(ϕ) ⇒ w(ϕ)} and S
∗
✸vw = infϕ∈L✸{v(ϕ) ⇒ w(✸ϕ)} to satisfy
the respective properties. (i) If v(T) = 1 then S
∗

vv = infϕ∈L{v(ϕ →
ϕ)} = 1. If v(T✸) = 1 then S
∗
✸
vv = infϕ∈L{v(ϕ → ✸ϕ)} = 1. (ii) If
v(4) = 1 then v(ϕ) ≤ v(ϕ) and so
S∗vv
′ · S∗v
′v′′ ≤ [(v(ϕ)⇒ v′(ϕ)) · (v′(ϕ)⇒ v′′(ϕ))]
≤ (v(ϕ)⇒ v′′(ϕ)) ≤ (v(ϕ)⇒ v′′(ϕ))
Taking meet over ϕ in the last formula we get: S∗

vv′ ·S∗

v′v′′ ≤ S∗

vv′′. (iii)
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If v(4✸) = 1 then v(✸✸ϕ) ≤ v(✸ϕ) and thus
S∗✸vv
′ · S∗✸v
′v′′ ≤ [(v′(✸ϕ)⇒ v(✸✸ϕ)) · (v′′(ϕ)⇒ v′(✸ϕ))]
≤ (v′′(ϕ)⇒ v(✸✸ϕ)) ≤ (v′′(ϕ)⇒ v(✸ϕ))
Minimizing over ϕ in the last formula we get S∗✸vv
′ · S∗✸v
′v′′ ≤ S∗✸vv
′′. 
One of the original motivations of the second author to study these
fuzzy modal logics was to interpret the possibility operator ✸ in the class
of Go¨del frames Refl ∩ Trans ∩ Symm as a notion of similarity in the
sense of Godo and Rodr´ıguez [9], and a reasonable conjecture was that
GS5✸ = GS4✸+B✸ would axiomatize validity in this frames. Unfortunately,
the axiomsB, B✸ do not force symmetry in the canonical models. Thus, we
have not been able to show completeness of G+B or G✸+B✸ for |=Symm,
even the less completeness of GS5✸ or GS5 = GS4+B with respect to
|=Refl∩Trans∩Symm. Perhaps stronger symmetry axioms as
(ϕ→ θ)→ ✷(✷ϕ→ θ)
✸(✸ϕ→ θ)→ (ϕ→ ✸θ)
would do. In any case, it is possible to show that validity in Go¨del Refl ∩
Trans ∩ Symm is decidable.
9 Adding truth constants
The previous results on strong completeness may be generalized to languages
with a set Q ⊆ [0, 1] of truth values added as logical constants to the
language, provided Q is topologically discrete and well-ordered, in particular
when Q is finite.
Introduce a constant connective symbol for each r ∈ Q, denoted by r
itself excepting 0 and 1 which are identified with ⊥ and ⊤. Let G(Q) be
the logic obtained by adding to G the axiom schemes R1 - R4 below, and
let G✸(Q) be defined similarly by adding to G✸ the book-keeping axioms R1
and R5 - R7, for all r, s ∈ Q :
R1. (book-keeping axioms)
r → s, if r ≤ s,
(r → s)→ s, if s < r
R2. r → r
R3. (r → θ)→ (r → θ)
R4. ((θ → r)→ r)→ ((θ → r)→ r)
R5. ✸r → r
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R6. ✸(r → ϕ)→ (r → ✸ϕ)
R7. ✸((ϕ→ r)→ r)→ ((✸ϕ→ r)→ r)
Note that the double negation shift axioms Z and Z✸ become superfluous
(follow from R4 and R7, respectively). Moreover, R2+R3 may be replaced
by the single axiom: (r → θ) ↔ (r → θ), and R5+R6 by ✸(r → ϕ) ↔
(r → ✸ϕ).
The evaluation of GK-models is extended by defining: e(x, r) = r for
each r ∈ Q. It may be shown then that G(Q) and G✸(Q) are strongly
complete for countable theories in their respective languages, and the same
holds for the logics mentioned in Theorem 8.1.
This extends substantially a result of Esteva, Godo and Nogera [4] on
weak completeness of Go¨del logic with rational truth constants. If one is
interested in weak completeness only, no condition is needed on Q since it
is enough to consider the finitely many truth constants appearing in the
sentence to be proved. On the other hand, discreteness of Q is necessary
for strong completeness: if r is a limit points in Q then there is a strictly
increasing or decreasing sequence converging to r, say {rn} increases to
sup rn = r, then
{r1 → θ, r2 → θ, r3 → θ....} |=GK r → θ
but no finite subset of premises can grants this, thus by soundness
{r1 → θ, r2 → θ, r3 → θ....} 0G(Q) r → θ,
Discreteness is not enough, however: Q = {r1 < r2 < .... .... < q2 < q1}
with sup ri = inf qi is discrete, and
r1 → θ, r2 → θ, .... , ψ → q1, ψ → q2, .... |=GK ψ → θ
but no finite subset of the premises yields the same consequence.
10 Comment
It rests to axiomatize validity and consequence of the full logic with both
modal operators combined. It may be seen that he union of the systems G
and G✸ is not enough for that purpose. However, G ∪ G✸ together with
Fischer Servi [5] ”connecting axioms”:
✸(ϕ→ ψ)→ (✷ϕ→ ✸ψ)
(✸ϕ→ ✷ψ)→ ✷(ϕ→ ψ)
may be proved to be a strongly complete axiomatization. This will be shown
in a sequel of this paper.
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